The Many Faces of Christianism -- Part 3: The 'Russian World' in Europe

The Many Faces of Christianism: The 'Russian World' in Europe -- Part 3, continued from Part 2 

Chapter 1 is an introduction to the book by all four editors:  Marietta van der Tol, Petr Kratochvíl, Sophia Johnson, and Zoran Grozdanov.

It introduced the concept of "imaginaries", which I struggled to understand, but I think I can interpret it in the Lacanian sense of an external image that shapes one's self-perception, as a child's image of itself is shaped by its reflection in a mirror. So there are two things: the child itself -- the reality, and the imaginary -- the external image that shapes the child's perception of itself. 

Among the imaginaries discussed in this chapter are the concepts of "Holy Rus'" and "Holy Russia" and what strikes me about it is that in this chapter they are discussed purely as imaginaries. They are not examined in context, and there is apparently no attempt to understand them theologically, or relate them to the thing that is reflected in the mirror. They are simply assumed to be exactly as the external Western observers assume them  to be in a kind of self-referential circle. The "Holy Rus'" referred to in this chapter is a Western imaginary of a Russian imaginary of an unmentioned original.

Recently, the idea of the Russian World has increasingly aligned with Russia’s expansionist policies. A politicized version of Christianity, and Russian Orthodoxy in particular, is highly influential in shaping the idea of the Russian World, partially through the canonical claims of the Russian Orthodox Church, but mostly through popularised notions of Holy Rus’ and Ancient Rus’ that imply the unity of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians as ‘brothers’. In this sense, the Russian World refers to an “organically unified transnational orthodox Christian Russian civilisation that includes the territories and people of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and sometimes other nations” (Van der Tol et al 2025:6). 

If this was meant to be a serious critique of the way a theological imaginary (Holy Rus') has influenced a secular political imaginary (Russian World), then it should surely compare the imaginary with the reality, and show how they differ. It should at least attempt to understand the original in its own terms rather that rather arrogantly assuming that its imaginary of an imaginary is the only correct view of the world.

What is Holy Rus', or Holy Russia? 

Holy Rus' refers to the spiritual descendants of Saints Olga and Vladimir of Kievan Rus', who introduced the Christian faith into the regions to the north of the Black Sea in the ninth century. Over the following centuries it spread to an area roughly covered by modern Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Over the centuries it developed some features that made it distinct from Christians in other parts of the world. It had a common liturgical language (Church Slavonic), and honoured as Saints a set of Christians unique to that part of the world. It is these Saints that constitute the essence of "Holy Rus'".

"Holy Russia" was a subset of those spiritual descendants of St Olga and St Vladimir who spoke the Russian language or lived in the Russian state, which developed mainly as a resistance to Mongol conquest in the twelfth century.  

In the 19th century the Napoleonic conquests sparked a resistance in the form of a romantic nationalism, which emphasised the distinctness of language and culture. In Russia it also led to the growth of a pan-Slavic nationalism. In the 20th century the Bolshevik Revolution resulted in most of the territory of Holy Rus' falling under  the domination of a radical Western secularist and internationalist ideology, which encouraged atheism and discouraged religion of any kind, including Christianity, and at least two generations grew up under this regime.

When the Bolshevik regime fell in 1990, many of the suppressed movements, including nationalism and Christianity, resurfaced. But after two generations of suppression, very few people had any idea of what they were about, and only had "imaginaries" to go on. These were often confused and mingled, sometimes quite deliberately by some people, and so various forms of Christian Nationalism (and unChristian Nationalism) developed.

In its original meaning, Holy Russia was not holy because it was Russian; it was holy because it was Christian. Holy Rus' linked people of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine because they were baptised, and not because they were part of a "Russian World". In the reality of Holy Rus' (as opposed to the imaginary) the war between Russia and Ukraine is tragic because it is a war between people who have been baptised in the Orthodox Christian faith and are therefore brothers through common citizenship of the Kingdom of God, and not of some earthly political entity. If they assert (or deny) that they are brothers because of belonging to some earthly political entity, then, from a Christian point of view, their attitude is idolatry -- they have idolised some secular conception of a nation, an "imaginary", if you like.

But this essential background history is entirely missing from the opening and introductory chapter of The Many Faces of Christianism. It is a serious defect.

It also seems to me that there is also a legitimate sense in which Holy Rus' or Holy Russia can be imaginaries -- rather in the way that C.S. Lewis described the relationship between Logres and Britain. 

Continued in Part 4: Populism and Religion  

The Many Faces of Christianism -- Part 2: Imaginaries and other buzz words

 The Many Faces of Christianism -- Part 2 -- continued from Part 1.

The first thing that struck me when I began to read The Many Faces of Christianism was the use of the word imaginaries. It appeared in the first paragraph, and about seven times in the first chapter (more if you include footnotes, none of which explained it).

Here is one of the sections in which the word appears in context:

In all of this, the bulwarks of present-day anti-liberalism, such as the notions of Holy Rus’ or the Russian World, nationalist and populist movements in Europe, as well as the Make America Great Again-campaign feature major political imaginaries: they assert a timeless connection between certain territories, certain people, and cultural or civilizational exceptionalism. All of these build on a connection of these political imaginaries with (selected aspects) of religious tradition.

One might conclude, therefore, that "imaginaries" are things that assert timeless connections between certain territories and people on the one hand, and cultural and civilizational exceptionalism on the other -- but it's still a rather nebulous concept.

I recalled, however that I had seen the term used a couple of years earlier in a book I had been editing. It popped up in Chapter 12, and I was unable to edit the sentences in which it appeared, because I had no idea what they meant. I asked the author, and suggested that he include a definition of it and a couple of other terms (like "hybridity") somewhere in the first chapter so that readers who encountered them later in the book could see what he was talking about.

He said the term had been suggested to him by a mutual friend and former colleague of mine in the Missiology Department at the University of South Africa (Unisa), Klippies Kritzinger, so I asked him what the term meant. I thought I had made a note of his reply, but I had mislaid it. I did a web search, which said it has something to do with the square root of -1. It took me some time to find Klippies Kritzinger's reply, and when I eventually did find it, it said:

I used the term 'imaginary' more or less in the sense that the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor does. He coined the term 'social imaginary', which is not the same as a theory. I use the term ecclesial imaginaries, which I first called the 'functional ecclesiologies' by which members view and experience the church. These are imaginaries such as: church as stokvel (you don't get buried from church building if you are owing on your 'dues'; church as theatre (it is mainly about entertainment: vibrant music and motivational speeches); church as school (mainly about teaching and learning); church as business (minister as CEO, flashy marketing and huge building); and so on... The wonderful biblical images of Body of Christ, people of God, group of disciples, bride of Christ, and so on are perhaps affirmed intellectually, but the actual praxis (theory-practice-theory-practice) is driven by these imaginaries. And I told Stephan that many URCSA members and students do church in these ways, which I find problematic and disappointing. I hope this helps a bit....

That did help in the case of the book I was editing two years ago, but it doesn't help much in the case of this book, which has "imaginaries" scattered throughout, but they seem to mean something other than popular erroneous conceptions of the Church. 

It does, however, seems to have become the Western theological buzzword of the 2020s, as "relevant" was in the 1960s, "contextual" in the 1970s, and "holistic" in the 1980s. It's one of those words that lots of people seem to use, but no one is quite sure what it means. 

Since retiring, however, I seem to have got out of touch with most Western theology, and I realised that I'd kept in touch with most of it while I was working through gossip in the Unisa cafeteria and editing theology study guides, but, since losing access to the Unisa library ten years ago, I've been pretty much out of touch with it. 

But reading The Many Faces of Christianism I begin to suspect that many Western theologians are as out of touch with Orthodox theology as I am with Western theology and view it mainly through Western Protestant/secular/political spectacles, and perhaps even primarily through the spectacles of the CIA.

In trying to get a handle on "imaginaries" I also asked on an English usage internet forum, some of whose members had access to more resources than I do, and it appears that it is not in the Oxford English Dictionary, but suggested it may have been imported from French, and was possibly connected with the French philosopher Lacan. And yes, that seems a promising path to follow, except that  I learn that, like Lacan's other contributions to psychoanalytic theory, it was subject to a continual reformulation throughout his work. It appears to mean an image external to oneself, like a child observing its reflection in a mirror. I'll have to think about that some more, and see if there are any clues further on in the book.

Holy Rus' is mentioned as one of the "imaginaries", but if an "imaginary" in the Lacanian sense, bears the relation of the image of a child in a mirror to the child itself (as Kritzinger's distorted ecclesiologies in relation to the Body of Christ suggest), then surely in a serious work of theology they should also be discussing the child, rather than just the imaginary? But the authors of this book, in effect, live in the world through the looking glass.

There are other terms that pop up without clear definitions, for example "anti-liberalism"  in the passage quoted above, and "liberal democracy" elsewhere. My initial impression (which may change when I've read more, though I doubt it) is that for the editors and most of the authors, "liberal democracy" is characteristic of the countries of Western Europe and North America, and "anti-liberalism" characteristic of Christian Nationalists. I'm sure that the second part of that is right, but I'm not sure of the first part. Britain's terrorism laws, for example, which treat opposition to genocide as terrorism, are far more draconian than South Africa's 1967 Terrorism Act, passed at the height of its Christian Nationalism phase.

Continued in Part 3.